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Connection: Update comment on replay attack

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We still have the same problem, but solution do it is much simpler than 
we first thought....
This commit is contained in:
Starbeamrainbowlabs 2022-02-11 21:23:54 +00:00
parent 1c5f5fb37a
commit 837804ec22
Signed by: sbrl
GPG key ID: 1BE5172E637709C2
1 changed files with 7 additions and 4 deletions
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11
src/lib/transport/Connection.mjs
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@ -175,10 +175,13 @@ class Connection extends EventEmitter {
if(new Date() - this.rekey_last > this.rekey_interval && !this.rekey_in_progress) if(new Date() - this.rekey_last > this.rekey_interval && !this.rekey_in_progress)
await this.rekey(); await this.rekey();
// TODO: Consider anonymous TLS, with jpake for mututal authentication /*
// TODO: Consider https://devdocs.io/node/crypto#crypto.createCipheriv() - which lets us use any openssl ciphers we like - e.g. ChaCha20-Poly1305 TODO: Consider anonymous TLS, with jpake for mututal authentication
TODO: Consider https://devdocs.io/node/crypto#crypto.createCipheriv() - which lets us use any openssl ciphers we like - e.g. ChaCha20-Poly1305
// TODO: We're currently vulnerable to a replay attack. We need to mitigate this somehow - probably by maintaining a sequence number. Instead of sending the sequence number though we should instead compute a MAC that also includes the message length and a bunch of other things etc. Of course, we will also need to make sure we don't fall afoul of mac-then-encrypt, encrypt-then-mac, etc issues... TODO: We're currently vulnerable to a replay attack. We need to mitigate this somehow - probably by maintaining a sequence number. Instead of sending the sequence number though we should instead compute a MAC that also includes the message length and a bunch of other things etc. Of course, we will also need to make sure we don't fall afoul of mac-then-encrypt, encrypt-then-mac, etc issues...
Ref https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4346#appendix-F.2 for the sequence counter in TLS
We do *not* need another manual MAC, as tweetnacl's secretbox uses xsalsa20-poly1305, which is an *authenticated* encryption algorithm. Thus, all we need do is prepend the plaintext with a sequence number.
*/
let payload = JSON.stringify({ event, message }); let payload = JSON.stringify({ event, message });
payload = encrypt_bytes( payload = encrypt_bytes(